Does unfairness reduce efficiency? Within-industry CEO pay inequity and firm efficiency in China

Han, Feng;Tee, Kienpin;Hao, Siyuan;Xiong, Rancen

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of CEO pay inequity within an industry on firm efficiency. We measure within-industry pay inequity as the difference in compensation between a firm's CEO and the second-highest-paid CEO in the same industry (or in the same size-industry group). Using R&D expenses and capital expenditures as the inputs, we construct data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) scores to evaluate firm efficiency. We find that within-industry CEO pay inequity is negatively associated with firm efficiency. We further show a significantly negative impact of within-industry CEO pay inequity on firm performance (ROA and Tobin's q). Overall, our findings highlight the destructive effect of CEO pay inequity within an industry which dampens executive motivation and leads to reduced firm efficiency, supporting relative deprivation theory and equity theory, the two major theories of perceived distributive injustice.

Journal

Finance Research Letters

Publication Name

Finance Research Letters

Volume

ISBN/ISSN

1544-6131

Edition

N/A

Issue

N/A

Pages Count

Location

N/A

Publisher

Elsevier

Publisher Url

N/A

Publisher Location

N/A

Publish Date

N/A

Url

N/A

Date

N/A

EISSN

N/A

DOI

10.1016/j.frl.2024.105137